A recent literature in economics assumes that workers di¤er in their mission preferences. These studies predict a premium on the matching of mission preferences between a worker and employer. This paper uses data from the Dutch LISS panel to examine this prediction for government workers. Results show that government workers whose political preferences match those of the political parties in o¢ ce are more satis…ed with the type of work they do as compared to government workers whose political preferences do not match. A match of political preferences has no e¤ect on the job satisfaction of workers outside the government sector.
Introduction
Many organizations strive for objectives other than pro…ts. Such organizations are commonly found in the public sector or in the private non-pro…t sector. While an entrepreneur in the private non-pro…t sector chooses her own objectives, the objectives for the public sector, particularly the government sector, are set by politicians. Those employed in the government sector work to meet these objectives. However, these workers may have their private preferences regarding the choice of available objectives to work on. As a result, the preferences of the politicians in o¢ ce and the private preferences of a government worker are not necessarily aligned.
Recent studies in economics have formalized this idea and have stressed the importance of the alignment of mission preferences between an agent and a principal (Besley and Ghatak 2005, Dur and Zoutenbier forthcoming). A common prediction is that workers enjoy a 'mission'premium in jobs where their private mission preferences match the employer's mission preferences. That is, workers enjoy working on objectives that are in line with their private preferences regarding the available objectives. Closely related is the rich literature on person-organization …t in organizational psychology, that has emphasized the importance of congruence of values between a worker and an organization for attraction, retention, and performance (Kristof 1996) . The theory of person-organization …t has also been studied in a public sector context. Studies in public administration have shown that public sector workers who …nd it important to be able to help others, report higher job satisfaction in jobs that o¤er the opportunity to help others (Bright 2008 , Steijn 2008 , Taylor 2008 , and Wright and Pandey 2008 .
This paper uses survey data on Dutch workers to test whether there exists a premium on the matching of mission preferences within the government sector. More speci…cally, I examine whether government workers are more satis…ed with their job if their private mission preferences are better aligned with the mission of the government in o¢ ce. While previous studies have exclusively used cross-sectional data on 'mission alignment'or 'value congruence', this paper exploits panel data from the Longitudinal Internet Studies for the Social sciences (LISS). The sample covers a period from 2008 up to 2011. The detailed questions on respondents' occupation details, political 1 preferences, and individual characteristics o¤er a unique opportunity to examine the e¤ects of the alignment of mission preferences in the government sector. A worker's mission alignment is proxied by comparing a worker's reported vote in parliamentary elections to the outcome of the formation of a coalition government after the election. I classify a worker's preferences as a match to those of the government, if a worker voted for one of the political parties that is in o¢ ce after the election. A worker's preferences do not match when a worker voted for one of the parties that is not in o¢ ce after the elections. Next, self-reported job satisfaction is used to measure a worker's well-being in a job. Job satisfaction is measured by the question: "How satis…ed are you with the type of work that you do?" This facet of job satisfaction relates most closely to a worker's satisfaction with work itself (which is of prime interest given the subject of study). Finally, I restrict the focus of the analysis to workers who are employed in the government sector rather than all workers in the public sector. The measure of mission alignment used in this paper seems more important for those workers under the most direct control of the politicians in o¢ ce. In contrast, the measures used in the previously mentioned studies on person-organization …t apply more widely to all jobs in the public sector.
The results of the empirical analysis are in line with the hypothesis. I …nd clear evidence of a premium in job satisfaction on the matching of mission preferences in the government sector. Government workers who match on political preferences to the political parties in o¢ ce report signi…cantly higher job satisfaction as compared to workers whose preferences do not match. The estimated di¤erence in reported job satisfaction is :391 points. The size of this e¤ect is comparable to the e¤ect of half an hour reduction in commuting time and is even larger than the e¤ect of having to work overtime on a regular basis. The e¤ect of a match of political preferences is insigni…cant for workers employed outside the government sector. Additionally, the results are robust to including both individual and time …xed e¤ects and controlling for a rich set of individual characteristics (age, education level, and health) and job characteristics (working hours, income, overtime, irregular hours, supervising task, commuting time, tenure, and job type).
My results nicely complement the existing empirical studies on personorganization …t. Moreover, studies on job satisfaction in economics have found that public sector workers report higher job satisfaction as compared to private sector workers (see for instance Clark and Senik 2006) . I …nd a similar result. Government workers report, on average, higher job satisfaction as compared to workers employed outside the government sector. Interestingly, this di¤erence is partly explained by the matching of political preferences. Only those workers who match on political preferences to the political parties in o¢ ce enjoy signi…cantly higher job satisfaction in the government sector. The estimated e¤ect on job satisfaction is positive but insigni…cant for a non-matching worker at :420 points, but is highly signi…cant and doubles in size for a matching worker (with an estimated e¤ect of :819 points).
Previous studies have shown that mission motivation is especially important for higher educated workers (Lewis and Frank 2002, Dur and Zoutenbier forthcoming) . In contrast to these studies I …nd that matching political preferences are particularly important for government workers with intermediate levels of education. The e¤ect of a match of political preferences is almost twice as large for government workers in the intermediate education categories as compared to the full sample of workers. The results for workers in the lowest or highest education categories are slightly weaker as compared to the full sample. In a parliamentary system, such as the Dutch system, a government in o¢ ce usually consists of a coalition of political parties rather than a single political party. This implies that even if a worker's preferred political party (as measured by their vote) makes it into government, it is still possible that this party will form a coalition with political parties that are con ‡icting with a worker's preferences. Using information on a worker's reported stance towards individual political parties shows that it is not only important if the party a worker voted for takes up o¢ ce, but also how a worker rates all of the political parties in a coalition. Government workers with a more positive attitude towards all coalition parties report signi…cantly higher job satisfaction as compared to workers with a more negative stance. A similar e¤ect is found when assessing the relative di¤erence in a worker's stance towards the coalition parties as compared to a worker's stance towards the opposition parties. Government workers who rate the coalition parties more favorably than the opposition parties report signi…cantly higher job satisfaction. The reverse is found for government workers who rate the coalition parties more negatively than the opposition parties.
I continue as follows. The next section brie ‡y discusses the relevant literature on job satisfaction. Section 3 describes the data used in testing and explains the empirical strategy. The results of the empirical analysis are reported and discussed in section 4. Section 5 concludes.
Related literature
There is a growing literature in economics on people's subjective well-being (see Frey and Stutzer 2002 for an extensive discussion on well-being measures and applications). A main …eld of interest in this literature is well-being at work or job satisfaction. Following the seminal paper by Freeman (1978) , a number of studies have examined the role of job satisfaction as a predictor of labour market outcomes. These studies have documented strong associations between job satisfaction and behavior in the workplace, such as job quits (Akerlof et al. 1988 , Clark et al. 1998 , and Shields and Ward 2001), absence rates (Clegg 1983) , and counterproductive activities in the workplace (Mangione and Quinn 1975) . A second strand of job satisfaction literature has examined the determinants of a worker's job satisfaction. Job satisfaction has been explained by a variety of di¤erent individual and job characteristics such as: a worker's age, gender, education, wage and tenure (Hamermesh 1977 , Borjas 1979 , Clark and Oswald 1996 , Clark 1997 .
More recently, a number of studies have examined di¤erences in subjective well-being between public sector and private sector employment (Blanch- ‡ower and Oswald 1999, Cabral Viera 2005, Diaz-Serrano and Cabral Viera 2005, Demoussis and Giannakopoulos 2007, and Ghinetti 2007) . The evidence on a public-private sector di¤erential in subjective well-being is mixed across countries. However, for most countries a public sector premium is found for a variety of di¤erent facets of job satisfaction. It is often argued that this di¤erential in job satisfaction is a result of intrinsic motivation or high job security in the public sector (see e.g. Luechinger et al. 2006 ).
Few studies have tried to empirically explain di¤erences in subjective well-being between public sector and private sector workers. A notable exception is a study by Luechinger et al. (2008) . They …nd that di¤erences between countries in public-private sector life satisfaction di¤erentials 1 are partly explained by cross-country di¤erences in regulatory policies and institutional constraints for the public sector. Other studies have attributed the di¤erence in subjective well-being between public sector and private sector workers to sorting. Heywood et al. (2002) use data on British workers and …nd no evidence of a public sector premium after controlling for unobserved heterogeneity between individuals. This indicates that the positive premium found in some studies is mainly the result of sorting. People who tend to report greater subjective well-being are more likely to work in the public sector (this is con…rmed in a study by Luechinger et al. 2010 ). These results generalize to a number of facets of job satisfaction such as satisfaction with work itself, pay, and the relation with the boss. Lastly, Clark and Senik (2006) do …nd a signi…cant premium for public sector workers in Britain and France after controlling for unobserved heterogeneity between individuals. However, they do not condition on wages indicating that these rents are (partly) a result of wage rents in the public sector (although for the French sample this is less likely). Again, these results generalize to a number of facets of job satisfaction including satisfaction with work itself.
Closely related to this paper are studies in public administration that examine how person-organization …t relates to job satisfaction using data on public sector workers. A common …nding in this literature is that public sector workers who rate it important to help others, and in addition, …nd that their job o¤ers the opportunity to help others report higher job satisfaction as compared to public sector workers who do not …nd that their job o¤ers the opportunity to help others (Bright 2008 , Steijn 2008 , Taylor 2008 , and Wright and Pandey 2008). Additionally, Leisink and Steijn (2009) show that these workers also report a higher willingness to exert e¤ort. 2 This paper di¤ers from the studies on person-organization …t in two ways. First, this paper uses data on workers from all sectors of the economy, which allows to compare the found results on government workers to non-government workers. Second, studies on person-organization …t have used only cross sectional variation in 'mission matching' to determine an e¤ect on job satisfaction whereas this paper exploits variation within the individual over time.
Data and empirical strategy
The data used in this paper come from the Longitudinal Internet Studies for the Social sciences (LISS), conducted by CentERdata. 3 The LISS panel is 2 Closely related to this study are a number of (…eld and lab) experiments in economics on mission motivation (Tonin and Vlassopoulos 2010, 2012, Fehrler and Kosfeld 2012, Gerhards 2012, and Carpenter and Gong 2013). These studies invariably …nd that participants with aligned mission preferences exert more e¤ort in a chosen or real e¤ort experiment as compared to participants with con ‡icting mission preferences. 3 The key variables of interest from this data set are a worker's political preferences, job satisfaction, and industry of employment. Workers'political preferences, as measured by the question: "For which party did you vote in the parliamentary elections of [22 November 2006/9 June 2010]?", are used to construct a variable indicating whether a worker matches on mission preferences to the government in o¢ ce. A worker is considered as a match when the political party that the worker has voted for in the foregoing elections has taken up o¢ ce in that speci…c time period. 4 A worker is classi…ed as not matching when a worker indicated to have voted for a political party that has not become part of the government in o¢ ce. 5 Furthermore, the survey includes a number of statements on facets of job satisfaction (such as wage, hours, career, atmosphere at work, and type of work). Respondents were asked to score themselves on a eleven-point scale ranging from "Not at all satis…ed" to "Fully satis…ed". I use the facet of job satisfaction that relates most to satisfaction with work itself, measured by 4 The Netherlands has a parliamentary political system with proportional representation in the house of representatives. In a parliamentary system, political parties that have a (coalition) majority in the house of representatives are able to take o¢ ce as a government. Such a majority is su¢ cient to implement policies. Political parties in o¢ ce after the elections of November 2006 are CDA (Christian Democrat party), PvdA (Labour party), and CU (Christian Union party). Political parties in o¢ ce after the elections of June 2010 are VVD (Liberal party) and CDA (Christian Democrat party) with support of the PVV (Freedom party) in parliament. 5 A possible bias would occur if people are dishonest about revealing their vote in the foregoing parliamentary elections. While it is not possible to observe whether a respondent reports honestly, respondents were given the opportunity to indicate that they "do not know" what they had voted or indicate that they "prefer not to say" on which party they voted. The number of observations in these categories is very low, namely between 1 and 5 percent each year. 6 the question: "How satis…ed are you with the type of work that you do?" 6 Finally, respondents indicated their sector of employment by answering the question: "In what sector do you work?" Respondents who answered: "Government Services, Public Administration and Mandatory Social Insurances" are labelled as a government worker, those who answered di¤erently are labeled as a non-government worker. 7 The focus of the analysis is on government workers rather than all workers in the public sector. Government workers are under most direct control of the government and, therefore, should bene…t most when their preferred political party is in o¢ ce.
The sample is restricted to observations from the 2008 to 2011 wave. The 2012 wave is excluded from the analysis because at the time of data collection there was no active government in o¢ ce, making it di¢ cult to de…ne the matching variable. This restriction leads to a sample of 1714 unique observations for whom there is data on employment details, political preferences, and a number of demographic variables.
Two methodical issues arise when trying to estimate the e¤ect of a worker's political preferences on a worker's job satisfaction using longitudinal data. First, a test proposed by Wooldridge (2002, pp. 290-291) 8 shows that the …xed e¤ects model is preferred to the random e¤ects model (p < :01), to account for unobserved heterogeneity between individuals. The second issue relates to the ordinal nature of the measure of job satisfaction. Several solutions have been put forth to account for endogeneity of individual e¤ects in models estimating ordinal relationships. 9 A drawback of these ordinal …xed e¤ects methods is that the estimated coe¢ cient size is very di¢ cult to in- 6 The results of the analysis are similar but slightly weaker when measuring job satisfaction by the more general question: "How satis…ed are you, all in all, with your current work?". No signi…cant e¤ect is found on a worker's satisfaction with wages, hours worked, career, or atmosphere at work. 7 Other answer categories include: Agriculture, Forestry, Fishery and Hunting, Mining, Industrial Production, Utilities, Construction, Retail trade, Catering, Transport, Storage and Communication, Financial, Business Services, Education, Healthcare and Welfare, Environmental Services, Culture, Recreation and other services, and Other. 8 In contrast to the Hausman test, the test proposed by Wooldridge (2002) terpret due to the inability to estimate ordinal category thresholds. Given that the ordinal …xed e¤ects methods o¤er no bene…ts in interpretation over the linear …xed e¤ects speci…cation, I use a cardinal scale of job satisfaction in the estimation. Geishecker and Riedl (2012) show that the assumption of cardinality still allows to interpret the results in ratio's of parameter estimates. A feel for the size of an e¤ect can be obtained by comparisons with other estimates from the same regression.
The following speci…cation is used in estimation:
The dependent variable, denoted by JS it , is the job satisfaction of worker i in time period t. The main variables of interest are a dichotomous variable G it indicating whether a worker is employed in the government sector or not, a dichotomous variable M it indicating whether a worker matches on political preferences to the government in o¢ ce or not, and an interaction between the government variable and the matching variable. Additionally, I include time varying control variables x it , individual …xed e¤ects i , and time …xed e¤ects t . Following the hypothesis, I would expect that a match of political preferences has no e¤ect when a worker is not employed in the government sector, so = 0. Whereas for workers employed in the government sector a match of political preferences should have a positive e¤ect + > 0, because such a worker can work on policy measures that are in line with a worker's private preferences regarding such a policy. Table 1 shows the descriptive statistics of the sample including a short description of each variable used in estimation. Average job satisfaction in the sample is around 7.7 on a scale to 10. Roughly 13 percent of all workers are employed in the government sector, corresponding to 131 to 189 observations each year. The fraction of workers that voted for a political party that has become part of the government in o¢ ce varies between 44 and 47 percent each year. Figure 1 shows that the di¤erence in job satisfaction between government workers and non-government workers is relatively small over the observation period. Looking closer at the job satisfaction of government workers over time in Figure 2 , I …nd that job satisfaction of matching government workers is slightly higher as compared to non-matching government workers in each observation year (although only signi…cant in 2008 and 2010). Additionally, Table 2 shows the distribution of reported votes over political parties. Almost 75 percent of all workers voted for one of the four larger political parties. The remaining 25 percent of workers indicated to have voted for one of the many smaller parties. The di¤erences in voting between government and non-government workers are small. There are a few exceptions, for instance, government workers are more likely to vote Labor party or Christian Union and less likely to vote Christian Democrats party, Socialist party, or Green party. 10 Table 3 shows the results of the linear …xed e¤ects estimation using the full sample of workers. The size of the coe¢ cient estimates should be interpreted with some caution due to the ordinal nature of the response variable. 11 The reported standard errors are clustered at the individual level to account for correlation of errors over time within the individual. The …rst estimation includes only a dummy indicating whether a worker is employed in the government sector and a dummy indicating whether a worker matches on political preferences to the political parties in o¢ ce. In line with previous literature, I …nd that workers in the government sector report higher levels of job satisfaction as compared to workers in other sectors. The di¤erence in reported job satisfaction is :578 and signi…cant. The e¤ect of a match of political preferences for workers in all sectors in the economy is insigni…cant and very close to zero (with a point estimate of :001).
Results
The second column of Table 3 additionally includes an interaction between a worker's sector of employment and the variable match. Results show that government workers with private political preferences that match those of the political parties in o¢ ce are signi…cantly more satis…ed with their 10 A number of studies have examined the political preferences of government workers. These studies …nd that government workers, as compared to the general population, are more likely to be left-wing orientated (Rattso and Sorensen 2013), although this does not always translate into a higher likelihood to vote for left-wing or socialist parties (Knutsen 2001 , 2005 , and Jensen et al. 2009 ). 11 It is important to note that all of the reported main results are robust to performing the analysis using an ordinal …xed e¤ects method (see table A.1 in Appendix A). This result is in line with Ferrer-i-Carbonell and Frijters 2004 who …nd evidence that the bias of the linear …xed e¤ects estimator is generally small when using ordinal data. The ordinal …xed e¤ects estimator used in comparison is the 'blow-up and cluster'estimator (see Baetschmann et al. 2011 for an extensive discussion). Geishecker and Riedl (2012) show that this method performs as well as or better than the other available ordered …xed e¤ects methods.
job as compared to government workers with non-matching political preferences. The estimated interaction coe¢ cient of government employment with match is positive and highly signi…cant. This interaction e¤ect is interpreted by looking at marginal e¤ects. A match of political preferences for workers within the government sector is associated with signi…cantly higher job satisfaction; the estimated e¤ect ( + ) is :349 with a p-value of :025. In contrast, a match of political preferences for workers outside the government sector seems to be of little importance for a worker's reported job satisfaction. The conditional coe¢ cient for match is slightly negative at :050 but highly insigni…cant. These results clearly indicate a premium in job satisfaction on the matching of political preferences in the government sector. 12 Moreover, a number of recent studies in economics have shown that public sector workers report signi…cantly higher levels of job satisfaction as compared to private sector workers (although this result is not robust to controlling for individual …xed e¤ects and income, see Heywood et al. 2002) . I …nd no signi…cant e¤ect of government employment for workers who do not match on political preferences to the political parties in o¢ ce. The conditional coe¢ cient is positive at :420 but insigni…cant. In contrast, becoming a government worker seems to have a particularly positive e¤ect when a worker has matching political preferences. The marginal e¤ect has doubled in size (:819) and is highly signi…cant (p = :010).
Next, column 3 includes a number of time varying demographic and job characteristics as control variables. The e¤ect of a match of political preferences for government workers is robust in both sign and signi…cance; the e¤ect increases slightly from :349 to :391 and remains highly signi…cant. 13 Likewise, the e¤ect of a match of political preferences for workers outside the government sector reduces slightly from :050 to :042 and remains in-signi…cant. Several of the demographic control variables turn out to have a 12 Additionally one may wonder whether all workers in the public sector enjoy higher job satisfaction when their political preferences match to the political parties in o¢ ce. Robustness analyses show that public sector workers experience a small but highly in-signi…cant mission premium. This indicates that the …ndings of this paper are indeed speci…c to workers employed in the government sector rather than workers from the public sector as a whole. 13 A feel for the size of the estimated e¤ects is found by comparing the estimates for the key variables to the estimates of the control variables. For instance, the e¤ect of a match of political preferences for government workers · (:391) is equivalent to a half an hour reduction in daily (one way) commuting time and is even larger than the e¤ect of having to work overtime on a regular basis. signi…cant impact on job satisfaction. Older workers are less satis…ed with their job as compared to younger workers, although this e¤ect is decreasing as workers grow older. The results do not show a clear e¤ect of education. The lowest and highest educated workers are more or less equally satis…ed with their job but the intermediate educated workers are much less satis…ed (although marginally insigni…cant p = :102). A workers subjective health score seems to matter only when the assessed health is very poor. Workers with at least moderate levels of health enjoy similar levels of job satisfaction. There are also some remarkable e¤ects of job characteristics on job satisfaction. For instance, workers who are expected to work overtime and workers who need to travel long to get to work are signi…cantly less satis-…ed with their job. On the other hand, a worker's reported job satisfaction increases in the gross monthly income of a worker. Finally, the time …xed e¤ects, which control for unobserved di¤erences between years, are jointly signi…cant (p < :01).
Previous research has shown that mission motivation is more important for higher educated workers (Lewis and Frank 2002, Dur and Zoutenbier forthcoming). To assess di¤erences between education levels I estimate equation (1) including all two-way and three-way interactions between the variables government, match and three education dummies (low education, intermediate education, and high education). 14 Table 4 reports the marginal e¤ects for each education category. In contrast to the previous literature I …nd that not the highly educated government workers but the intermediate educated government workers are a¤ected most by matching mission preferences. The e¤ect of a match of political preferences for intermediate educated government workers is :697 and highly signi…cant. The marginal e¤ect for low or high educated government workers is smaller and almost of equal size to the full sample, but insigni…cant. In line with the main results, a match of political preferences has no e¤ect on job satisfaction for any education category of workers employed outside the government sector. The di¤erences between education levels in the e¤ect of matching political preferences for government workers is mainly explained by di¤erences in the marginal e¤ect of government employment for non-matching workers. Table 4 additionally shows the marginal e¤ect of government employment for matching and nonmatching workers. Becoming a government worker has the same e¤ect at any education level for workers with matching political preferences. The marginal e¤ect ranges from :703 for higher educated government workers to :773 for lower educated government workers. There are, however, substantial di¤erences across education levels in the e¤ect of becoming a government worker for workers whose political preferences do not match. The marginal e¤ect for lower educated workers (:316) and, in particular, higher educated workers (:488) is much larger as compared to the marginal e¤ect for intermediate educated workers ( :044). As a result, the di¤erences between matching and non-matching workers are largest in the intermediate education category.
In the Netherlands the government in o¢ ce usually consists of multiple political parties, also referred to as a coalition government. This implies that even if a worker's preferred political party (as measured by their vote) makes it into government, it is still possible that this party will form a coalition with political parties that are con ‡icting with a worker's preferences. Table 5 shows the reported stance towards individual political parties for both government and non-government workers. 15 There are relatively small di¤erences in reported stance between government and non-government workers. The most remarkable di¤erences are found for the parties at the far left and far right. Government workers are signi…cantly less positive about the Socialist party and Freedom party as compared to non-government workers. Table 6 shows the results of the analysis using the information on a worker's stance towards individual political parties. Column 1 shows the e¤ect of a worker's stance towards the largest coalition party on reported job satisfaction. Government workers who report a more positive stance towards the largest party in a coalition enjoy higher levels of job satisfaction as compared to workers with a less positive stance. The standardized marginal e¤ect equals :122 and is marginally signi…cant. Additionally, the estimation in column 2 shows that it is far more important whether a worker's stance towards all political parties in a coalition is positive. A worker's stance towards the entire coalition is measured by a worker's average rating of all individual coalition parties. Government workers with a more positive stance towards all coalition parties report signi…cantly higher levels of job satisfaction as compared to those with a more negative stance. The marginal e¤ect of a standard deviation increase for government workers equals :162. In line with the main results, a worker's stance towards coalition parties is unimportant for job satisfaction of workers in other sectors of the economy. These results are robust to weighting the political parties by their number of seats in parliament. The standardized marginal e¤ect reduces slightly from :162 to :154 but remains highly signi…cant.
Next, column 4 of Table 6 reports the results using information on the relative di¤erence between a worker's reported stance towards coalition parties and opposition parties. The results are very much in line with the previous columns. Workers in the government sector who have a more positive stance towards the coalition parties as compared to the opposition parties enjoy signi…cantly higher levels of job satisfaction than workers with a more positive stance towards the opposition parties as compared to the coalition parties. The marginal e¤ect of a standard deviation increase for government workers equals :131 and is highly signi…cant. Column 5 shows that these results are robust to weighting political parties by their number of seats in parliament. The standardized marginal e¤ect increases slightly from :131 to :135: These results indicate that it is not only important whether a worker's …rst preference (as measured by their vote) matches to the political parties in o¢ ce, but also what other parties have joined the coalition government after the election. A natural explanation is that, in the Netherlands, government policy is a result of intensive negotiations by coalition parties on the policy matters at hand. Therefore, political parties in o¢ ce often have to compromise when making policy plans.
Concluding remarks
This paper has studied how matching mission preferences a¤ect job satisfaction of government workers using a sample of Dutch workers. Results show that government workers whose mission preferences (as measured by their vote in parliamentary elections) match those of the political parties in o¢ ce are more satis…ed with their job as compared to government workers whose preferences do not match. No similar e¤ect is found for workers employed outside the government sector. Moreover, my results show that public sector workers report higher job satisfaction as compared to private sector workers. This di¤erence is partly explained by matching mission preferences. Only those workers whose mission preferences match those of the political parties in o¢ ce are signi…cantly more satis…ed when employed in the government sector. The results are particularly strong for intermediate educated workers. Furthermore, results show that it is not only important if a worker's preferred party takes up o¢ ce (as measured by their vote), but also how a worker rates all of the other parties that have taken up o¢ ce.
An interesting addition to this study would be to examine how matching mission preferences relate to sorting. Theory predicts that workers sort to organizations they share a mission with (Besley and Ghatak 2005, Dur and Zoutenbier forthcoming). This leads to two interesting implications. First, employee turnover should be higher following election years with a change in government as compared to years without a change in government. As a change in government (and therefore mission) would create an exogenous shock to workers'mission motivation. Second, one would expect an in ‡ow of workers whose mission preferences match those of the government, while the out ‡ow of workers should consist largely of workers whose mission preferences con ‡ict with the mission of the government. Unfortunately it is not possible to shed light on these issues using the LISS data. 
Tables
(3) Notes: Standard errors between parentheses are clustered at the individual level. Positive stance refers to: the largest party in column (1), the average of coalition parties in column (2), the average of coalition parties weighted by the number of seats in parliament in column (3), the di¤erence between coalition parties and opposition parties in column (4) , and the di¤erence between coalition parties and opposition parties weighted by the number of seats in parliament in column (5) .
The variable positive stance is standardized in each column for comparison purposes. *, **, and *** indicate signi…cance based on a two sided test at the .10, .05, and .01 levels, respectively. Notes: Histogram shows the average reported job satisfaction in each year including a 90% con…dence interval.
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A Appendix Log Likelihood -2523 -2517 -2455 Notes: Standard errors between parentheses are clustered at the individual level. *, **, and *** indicate signi…cance based on a two sided test at the .10, .05, and .01 levels, respectively.
